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1. Introduction
The late 1980s to early 2000s constituted a period of signiﬁcant trade reform initiatives across the
developing world. During these years, protectionist policies and import substitution-led strategies
were abandoned as the developing countries sought to achieve more sustainable paths to
development and greater economic integration into the global trading system. For some countries,
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the process of trade reforms was undertaken without trade adjustment assistance and external
assistance. For many, however, trade reforms were aided by international organizations, both
technically and ﬁnancially. This paper studies economic performance after trade reforms and the role
of trade adjustment lending extended by the World Bank to a large number of developing countries
from 1987 to 2004.
By focusing on this episode of trade reforms and trade adjustment loans, our work provides a
historical account and contributes to a strand of the literature that studies the effect of trade
adjustment assistance on economic reform. Recent works, notably Cadot et al. (2011), point out that
the challenges facing any evaluation framework on the effectiveness of trade adjustment assistance
are due to the lack of consensus on suitable criteria for distributing the aid for trade effectively. Any
evaluation study is further complicated by the wide variation in the quality of data and cross-country
empirical speciﬁcations.1 Against these backdrops, a recurring theme in the literature is to search for
answers to the following two empirical questions: ﬁrst, were economic reforms beneﬁcial to the
countries that undertook them, i.e. in terms of macroeconomic outcomes, productivity, and GDP
growth; and, second, did the trade adjustment assistance have favorable value-added impacts that
helped improve the economic outcomes signiﬁcantly in the aid-recipient countries?
Trade has traditionally been viewed as a driving factor of external balance and an engine of growth
through improved resource allocation, stronger incentives for adaptation and innovation, cheaper
capital goods, and higher foreign direct investment ﬂows associated with new trade opportunities.
While it is believed that countries grow more rapidly by abandoning a long-term autarkic approach,
existing evidence on the association between trade reforms and economic performance have been
inconclusive. As trade remains important to the overall development strategy in the developing
countries, this empirical uncertainty has generated a long-standing debate on whether there is any
link between trade reform and economic growth, as well as any potential role of trade adjustment
assistance and external intervention.
In the past, well-known studies such as those by Sachs and Warner (1995), Krueger (1998),
Edwards (1998), Frankel and Romer (1999), Dollar and Kraay (2004) and Berg et al. (2012) suggest that
more open countries tend to grow faster. In the literature, openness to trade, or trade intensity, is
typically deﬁned as the ratio of gross trade (imports plus exports) relative to GDP. However, as Looi
Kee et al. (2009) and Collier et al. (1999) argue, the trade intensity index may not be entirely
appropriate as an indicator of the trade policy stance. The index may instead reﬂect an increase in aid
ﬂows or an improvement in terms of trade rather than the extent of trade reforms. Further, Rodriguez
and Rodrik (2000) point out methodological problems with the empirical strategies thus far
undertaken to establish the relation between trade reform and economic growth, particularly the use
of the openness dummy variable proposed by Sachs and Warner (1995) and later by Wacziarg and
Welch (2008). This is because in practice the openness dummy variable that aims to characterize the
restrictiveness of a trade policy regime is often correlated with other measures of poor economic
performance. To improve upon the restrictiveness measure of a trade regime, Wacziarg and Welch
(2008) attempt to identify years when non-reversed trade liberalization programs were launched.
Applying this new indicator together, they ﬁnd that output, investment, and openness increase
signiﬁcantly after trade liberalization.
Clearly, a proper identiﬁcation of the years in which trade reforms have taken place allows for a
more assertive conclusion about the impact of trade reforms on output growth and other variables of
general interests, including both export and import growth. For example, using twenty-two episodes
of trade liberalization, Santos-Paulino and Thirlwall (2004) ﬁnd that after controlling for several
variables such as changes in world demand and the real effective exchange rate, trade liberalization
still has a large positive impact on both import and export growth. In addition, an empirical
framework also needs to take into account contemporaneous events and lagged effects in assessing
the economic response to trade reforms; for instance, Greenaway et al. (2002) show in a dynamic
model of growth that trade liberalization impacts the growth rates of real GDP per capita favorably,
with the effect appearing to be modest, lagged and relatively persistent.
1 Also see the useful discussions in Wei and Zhang (2010), Deaton (2010), and Rajan and Subramanian (2008).
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In this paper, we evaluate the impact of trade reforms on the growth of aggregate output, imports,
and exports, explicitly taking into account a provision of trade adjustment assistance for trade
reforms. To deal with the potential inﬂuence of a selection bias, our analysis ﬁrst differentiates
whether a country received trade adjustment assistance or not, and then studies its economic
outcomes after trade reform. We proceed by reporting descriptive statistics of the initial conditions in
both aid for trade recipient and non-recipient groups, followed by a formal speciﬁcation to address the
selection problem in the sample econometrically. Our study period is 1987–2004, when active lending
by the World Bank coincided with major trade reforms, covering more than sixty countries and almost
three hundred loans. Whether these trade adjustment loans were helpful to economic growth remains
an open empirical question. Our ﬁndings suggest that these loans affected the recipient group more
appreciably after trade reform, particularly concerning the growth of aggregate output and imports,
while the effect on exports was rather mixed and relatively modest.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reports background data and describes the
initial conditions and economic outcomes in countries that underwent trade reforms during 1987–
2004. Section 3 presents the empirical framework and discusses the econometric approach we use to
deal with the selection bias and the endogeneity problem in a panel sample of aid recipient and non-
recipient countries. Section 4 reports the ﬁndings and Section 5 concludes.
2. Background data
Our sample focuses on the period of active trade adjustment lending by the World Bank spanning
1987–2004 and, subject to data availability, covers 45 developing countries that undertook major
trade reforms. For each country, we study the data of two years before and eight years after trade
reform. In total, we have a balanced panel of 450 country-year observations (with one observation for
constructing a lag period). To determine this ten year window of country-year observations, we take
into account several considerations. First, different countries carried out trade reforms at different
periods in time, spanning the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. Clearly, this implies that the empirical
analysis is subject to both endogenous and selection bias since the implemented trade reform is likely
dependent on various country-speciﬁc factors, prevailing aid conditionality, as well as global
economic cycles. This inevitable challenge is also faced by most macroeconomic studies on trade
adjustment assistance. Second, and consequentially, we have to set a comparable time frame to
evaluate the effectiveness of trade adjustment lending across countries. It is not entirely clear how
long before and after a trade reform would perfectly ﬁt each country’s economic circumstances. By
looking at two years before and eight years after reform, the objective is to have a study window for
comparison across countries. This is of course subject to data limitations, but it serves the objective of
this study, which is to examine the effectiveness of trade adjustment loans on trade reforms. Third, we
exclude countries that did not carry out major trade reforms, as their inclusion would entail
conducting a differences-in-differences-in-differences investigation, which is beyond the goal of this
study, and subject to the currently available empirical methodology that we ﬁnd plausible given the
set of countries under focus. That being said, there could still be a case that policy interventions, be
they tax, trade, or monetary policy, may have little effect on the targeted outcome due to some
unobserved common causes driving all the observable variation. In this vein, focusing on each
country’s speciﬁc window of two years before and eight years after trade reform may help mitigate an
empirical challenge, whereby if non-reformers were included, it is uncertain what time frame or years
of study should be applied to the non-reformer group of countries to examine the role of aid for trade
reform.
To be selected for the sample, countries must have undertaken one or more identiﬁable trade
reform programs in the study period. Given this criterion, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and Asia
make up 38 percent, 33 percent, and 13 percent, respectively. Given a small number of countries for
Europe and Central Asia (Turkey), Middle East (three countries) and South Asia (three countries), a
regional breakdown of descriptive statistics is treated with caution. Countries that experienced a
major civil conﬂict (following Collier et al., 2004) during the sample period were excluded, i.e.
Afghanistan, Angola, Liberia, and Rwanda. Centrally planned economies in transition (e.g., part of the
former Soviet Union during the study period) were also excluded. Out of these forty-ﬁve countries in
Y. Jinjarak et al. / Economic Systems 37 (2013) 415–430 417
Author's personal copy
the ﬁnal sample, thirty-ﬁve countries received trade adjustment loans from the World Bank to aid the
implementation of trade reforms.
We identify a year of major trade reform for each country and use this as a basis in our empirical
analysis. Our identiﬁcation of trade reform years across countries is due to the criteria examined in the
Operations Evaluation Department (Jinjarak and Salinas, 2005), which are based on both the literature
and the qualitative description provided in the sources referred to in this paper. Essentially, we study
the evolution of average tariffs and non-tariff barriers, and classify a country’s trade policy accordingly
by its initial restrictiveness, ﬁnal restrictiveness, and pace of reform, as explained below.
Initial Restrictiveness: based on average tariffs and non-tariff barriers. Countries in our sample are
assigned to one of the following four categories: I.i) restrictive but degree unknown (not enough
information to differentiate the degree of restrictiveness though clearly not open); I.ii) extremely
restrictive (either non-tariff barriers frequency ratio above 60%, simple average tariff above 80%,
standard deviation of tariffs above 30, or communist country); I.iii) highly restrictive (non-tariff
barriers between 25% and 80% and tariffs between 30% and 80%); I.iv) restrictive (either non-tariff
barriers frequency ratio between 5% and 30% and average tariffs between 20% and 80%, or non-tariff
barriers between 30% and 80% and tariffs below 15%); and I.v) open.
Final Restrictiveness: based on the following indices and indicators; IMF trade restrictiveness index,
CPIA trade indicator, average unweighted tariff, frequency ratios of non-tariff barriers, black market
premium, tariff escalation, existence of a major state monopoly in trade, use of export repatriation
requirements, use of restrictions to current account transactions. The ﬁnal restrictiveness is then
classiﬁed into the following categories: F.i) highly open (at the end of the period, tariffs are at most
moderate, non-tariff barrier regime is open; black market exchange rate premium is below 10%; there
is no state monopoly in trade; CPIA trade indicator was 4.5 or above in 1999–2001; else, countries with
signiﬁcant tariff escalation; export repatriation requirements; or restrictions to current account
transactions are excluded from this category; F.ii) open (initially ‘not open’, but at the end of the
period, tariffs are at most moderate, non-tariff barrier regime is open; no state monopoly in trade;
CPIA trade indicator was 4.0 or above in 1999–2001); F.iii) moderately open (does not qualify as F.i) or
F.ii); and F.iv) restrictive (either non-tariff barriers are restrictive or non-tariff barriers are moderate
and tariffs are relatively restrictive; no signiﬁcant reduction in tariffs and non-tariff barriers is
recorded).
Pace of trade reform: P.i) rapid (most of the tariff and non-tariff reduction happened within a 3-year
period); P.ii) gradual (trade reform happened slowly). As trade policy can be reformed at different
paces, for countries that went through the reform gradually, a year of trade reform is identiﬁed as the
time when a reduction in trade barriers started. In the case of countries that underwent trade reform
rapidly, a year of reform is identiﬁed when a large reduction in trade barriers started, even though in
some cases the rapid reform was preceded by minor trade liberalization.2 Appendix B contains the
classiﬁcation, presenting by country the initial conditions, pace of trade reform, and ﬁnal
restrictiveness of trade regimes.
Table 1 reports indicators of trade policy across countries in the sample. Trade regimes were
extremely restrictive prior to the ﬁrst wave of reforms that started in the early 1980s: average tariffs
on goods were above 29 percent and non-tariff barriers frequency ratios were above 50 percent. Note
that in addition to the high level of trade protection, countries frequently applied other restrictions to
current account transactions and repatriation requirements related to exports proﬁts. By region, the
highest levels of protection were observed in South Asia and in the Middle East and North Africa. For
the group of 35 countries that both implemented trade reforms and received trade adjustment loans
from the World Bank, the initial levels of import tariff were lower at around 26 percent on average
compared to 33 percent in the non-recipient group. However, the recipient group had a greater use of
non-tariff barriers, registering 69 percent of tariff lines compared to 37 percent in the non-recipient
countries prior to reform. As a result, for the recipient group the size of import duties as a percent of tax
revenue tended to be lower than that observed in the non-recipient group in the sample.
2 For example, this is the case in Argentina, where the identiﬁed year of trade reform is 1991, while a mild liberalization was
already implemented in the late 1980s. If Argentina were classiﬁed as a gradual reformer, the selected year of reform would
have been 1986, when the initial liberalization efforts started.
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Table 1
Indicators of trade policy.
Trade barriers Period since
trade reform
All Region Income level Recipient of
trade
adjustment
loans
Pace of trade
reform
Intensity of
trade reform
AFR EAP ECA LAC MNA SAR Low Middle Yes No Fast Gradual Intense Not
Average tariff (unweighted, %) 0 30.4 24.4 30.8 22.7 28.1 26.0 69.7 34.5 28.7 31.9 27.6 34.3 27.6 30.7 30.6
I 27.9 24.7 23.1 9.5 23.9 40.6 68.9 29.2 27.1 29.1 21.0 28.8 27.1 21.7 29.4
II 20.8 20.8 23.7 9.5 13.5 25.0 48.0 24.7 18.2 23.1 14.7 18.9 23.2 21.7 20.7
III 17.6 18.1 21.4 8.3 12.0 26.8 31.6 21.1 15.1 18.5 15.4 17.6 18.0 16.8 18.2
Non-tariff barriers (% of tariff lines) 0 59.1 62.9 43.9 96.4 39.0 63.7 74.3 66.1 45.6 69.9 23.9 55.3 56.9 57.3 56.0
I 42.1 36.1 42.2 96.4 27.0 63.7 48.8 40.3 37.3 44.1 14.6 31.2 45.8 62.6 33.8
II 17.2 11.8 7.7 96.4 20.2 28.9 18.1 9.2 17.5 17.4 5.1 15.0 15.3 24.8 12.9
III 21.6 41.3 25.6 9.4 3.5 27.6 21.5 44.4 7.3 23.7 8.7 14.1 28.7 25.8 21.3
Import duties (% of tax revenue) 0 22.3 26.6 16.7 8.1 14.2 35.7 37.2 31.2 18.5 22.8 22.5 21.3 23.9 17.0 23.8
I 21.9 25.5 19.4 7.7 15.1 32.8 34.4 28.3 18.9 23.0 19.6 20.3 23.9 19.5 22.8
II 24.1 31.5 20.3 5.1 16.0 30.4 35.1 33.0 20.2 26.4 20.1 22.0 27.0 22.6 25.0
III 21.9 34.2 15.6 3.4 14.9 25.4 31.3 34.8 17.6 24.2 17.0 20.3 24.0 12.8 24.1
Period since trade reform is deﬁned as I for 1–2 years, II for 3–5 years, and III for 6–8 years.
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Across regions, trade reform was evident in our sample, with the exception of Africa, the Middle
East and North Africa. While trade protection in Tunisia was high, its trade policy with large trading
partners, i.e. the European Union, was going through signiﬁcant liberalization under the trade
agreement signed in 1995. Further, some countries in South Asia remained protected after reforms
during the study period. Overall, the pattern of trade reforms was heterogeneous across regions,
varying in pace and magnitude. Almost half of all reform episodes were implemented rapidly, with
most of the reforms completed in less than three years. There was no geographical pattern to the speed
of reform, though regions in South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa were more likely to be
gradual reformers. Some countries in the sample implemented a dual scheme approach to trade
reform, maintaining high protection of domestic industries, but providing liberal trade policies in the
so-called export platforms, or export processing zones. About ten percent of the countries in the
sample, mainly in East Asia (China, Vietnam), the Middle East and North Africa (Tunisia), followed this
dual system approach.
Looking at Table 1, it appears as if trade adjustment loans from the World Bank did not signiﬁcantly
affect the intensity or speed of trade reforms. Non-recipient countries cut average tariffs by half,
similar to the recipient group, and signiﬁcantly reduced the frequency ratios of non-tariff barriers (as
well as lowering restrictions on current account transactions and export repatriation requirements).
While countries that underwent trade reforms with trade adjustment loans reduced non-tariff barrier
frequency ratios more, this difference to the non-recipient group is not statistically signiﬁcant. In
addition, the non-recipient countries were as likely to implement trade reforms rapidly as was the
recipient group.
Table 2 provides the initial economic conditions, contrasting the macroeconomic details of the
recipient and non-recipient groups. On average, countries that received trade adjustment loans from
the Work Bank tended to have more imbalances in the initial macroeconomic conditions, including
signiﬁcantly higher inﬂation and smaller tax bases, in comparison to other countries that undertook
trade reforms on their own. The recipient group also faced greater external pressures, terms of trade
ﬂuctuations, lower growth, lower investment, and higher external debt-to-GDP ratios. These
macroeconomic imbalances in the recipient group were often associated with balance of payments
difﬁculties, presaging the tendency to seek trade adjustment assistance and external intervention.
Table 3 reports macroeconomic conditions classiﬁed by region and income levels. High and persistent
inﬂation was clearly evident in Latin America, while external imbalances were most pronounced in
Africa, where current account deﬁcits, terms of trade deterioration, and external debt difﬁculties were
pervasive. Economic growth was modest for all countries in the sample, except East Asian economies.
With average investment rates below 20 percent, meager FDI inﬂows and an anemic trade
performance, overall GDP growth averaged below 3 percent, even though the fast-growing East Asian
economies were included in the sample. In all regions except East and South Asia the low growth rate
barely kept up with the level of population growth.
Table 2
Initial conditions: trade adjustment loan recipients and non-recipients.
Economic conditions All Recipients Non-recipients
Macroeconomic conditions
Real effective exchange rates 96.4 96.4 96.0
Inﬂation 21.7 21.0 20.4
Fiscal balance/GDP (%) 4.1 4.7 2.2
Tax revenue/GDP (%) 13.8 13.4 15.5
Investment to GDP (%) 19.7 18.3 24.3
Per capita GDP growth (%) 0.8 0.4 1.8
External conditions
Exports growth (%) 6.1 5.3 6.5
Imports growth (%) 2.3 2.4 0.6
Trade to GDP (%) 54.7 52.6 64.5
Current account balance to GDP (%) 3.8 4.4 2.1
Terms of trade 99.2 98.2 102.7
Total external debt to GDP (%) 80.5 92.3 41.1
Reserves in months of imports (%) 2.5 2.3 3.1
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Evidently, Tables 1–3 suggest several causes that were unfavorable and common to all countries
prior to their major trade reforms. However, between the recipients of trade adjustment loans and the
non-recipient group, there are marked differences that could potentially inﬂuence the economic
performance after trade reforms. We attempt to account for these differences more formally in the
following section.
3. Empirical speciﬁcation
In order to assess the economic impact of trade reform and the effectiveness of trade adjustment
assistance for trade simultaneously, we need to formally take into account a selection bias potentially
driven by the provision of trade adjustment loans. The underlying model of the outcome variable (yit)
is speciﬁed as:
yit ¼ axit þ bsit þ fwit þ cil þ uit ; t ¼ 1; . . . ; T; (1)
where xit is a set of policy variables that would have been observable in the absence of trade
adjustment lending in country i at time t; sit is a dummy variable for country i in year t for being in the
recipient group; wit is a vector of explanatory variables; cil represents unobservable country-speciﬁc
effects, and uit is the error term. We conduct the estimation in two stages, with the ﬁrst stage
estimating the probability of participation, sit, and the second stage estimating the effect of trade
reforms in the presence of trade adjustment loans.
In this speciﬁcation, we attempt to take into account several considerations that are speciﬁc to the
present empirical question. First, trade adjustment assistance and its conditionality are typically tied
to policy variables, i.e. the level and dispersion of import tariffs, and the existence and scope of non-
tariff barriers. However, the success of trade adjustment assistance is measured by aggregate
economic outcomes, which are potentially inﬂuenced by a wide range of other policy variables (e.g.,
monetary, ﬁscal and exchange rate policies, ﬁnancial sector and labor market reforms, as well as
supply-side policies affecting the productivity of domestic ﬁrms). This makes it difﬁcult to conclude
that trade reforms and aid for trade lead to expanded trade and economic growth. Based on the
literature on evaluation frameworks for trade adjustment assistance, our speciﬁcation is an attempt to
address not only the economic growth outcome, but also other important considerations including the
selection bias, endogeneity, and policy reaction. Given the research question and data availability over
the speciﬁc episode we are interested in, we cannot accommodate a large set of speciﬁcations and
variables in an exhaustive and experimental way, e.g. that of Sala-I-Martin (1997). Second, even when
all relevant policy variables take optimal values, exogenous shocks and external factors can still affect
Table 3
Initial conditions by region and income level.
All Region Income level
AFR EAP ECA LAC MNA SAR Mid. Low
Macroeconomic conditions
Real effective exchange rates 96.4 94.5 96.9 99.3 98.9 96.8 94.5 97.4 95.0
CPI Inﬂation 21.7 20.2 7.2 73.7 34.3 7.3 6.9 22.7 18.6
Fiscal balance/GDP (%) 4.1 5.0 2.7 3.0 1.8 8.6 7.9 3.3 5.2
Tax revenue/GDP (%) 13.8 12.6 15.1 11.0 14.6 19.2 10.1 15.9 11.5
Investment to GDP (%) 19.7 15.9 27.2 25.1 19.7 23.6 20.8 22.0 16.7
Per capita GDP growth (%) 0.8 0.8 4.7 0.4 0.5 0.6 3.4 1.3 0.1
External conditions
Exports growth (%) 6.1 0.1 7.8 24.4 8.9 14.3 8.7 8.8 1.6
Imports growth (%) 2.3 2.2 6.9 3.0 3.6 8.5 2.5 4.0 0.4
Trade to GDP (%) 54.7 53.1 51.7 36.2 60.8 76.8 27.2 61.2 47.8
Current account/GDP (%) 3.8 4.7 2.9 1.8 3.1 4.7 4.3 2.9 5.0
Terms of trade 99.2 97.8 97.6 101.5 102.5 100.0 94.7 100.9 97.0
Total external debt to GDP (%) 80.5 89.7 76.0 45.5 83.8 77.7 37.9 71.4 93.4
Reserves (months of imports) 2.5 1.8 3.1 2.5 3.2 1.8 3.2 2.9 2.1
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the aggregate outcomes. These shocks may include terms of trade movements and natural disasters
(i.e. droughts and hurricanes). Third, the empirical speciﬁcation also has to deal with the
counterfactual, speciﬁcally what would have happened to the country’s trade policies and economic
outcomes in the absence of trade adjustment assistance. Since the counterfactual is not observable, an
approximation is necessary. A number of studies have attempted to construct relevant counterfactuals
to isolate the impact of trade adjustment assistance, notably Conway (1994, 1998) and Atoyan and
Conway (2006).
To describe our two stage approach in detail, we refer to a procedure proposed by Heckman (1979).
In the ﬁrst stage, the probability of participation in trade adjustment lending is estimated as a function
of growth, inﬂation, external debt, terms of trade, and natural disasters. In the second stage, the
inverse Mill’s ratio from the ﬁrst stage is included in the growth estimation to account for the potential
selection bias from the provision of trade adjustment loans. Speciﬁcally, in the ﬁrst stage, the
probability of a country receiving any trade adjustment lending from the World Bank is obtained from
the Probit estimation:
sit ¼ gxit2 þ ci2 þ vit
sit ¼ 1 if s

it > 0
0 if sit  0
(2)
We observe yit when a country i receives a trade adjustment loan in year t, and hence sit=1 for the
recipient group. As discussed in Wooldridge (2010), under any assumption that allows for an
unobserved effect in the selection equation, adding the inverse Mill’s ratio obtained from the Probit
results and then using ﬁxed effects in a follow-up estimation does not produce consistent estimators.
This is because of another potential problem – the presence of unobserved heterogeneity arising from
different country characteristics. In a linear panel data analysis, the unobserved heterogeneity is
differenced out using ﬁxed effects models. In the present context, consistent estimates are obtained by
ﬁrst estimating a Probit of sit on xi for each t, saving the inverse Mill’s ratio,
3 denoted by lit, for all i and
t, and then running the pooled OLS regression using:
yit on xit ; xi; lit for all sit ¼ 1 (3)
Next, to allow for unobservable country-speciﬁc effects and non-random sample selection in the
panel data, following Wooldridge (2010),
sit ¼ 1½gtxi þ ci2 þ vit > 0; vit jðxi; ci1; ci2Þ  Normalð0; 1Þ; (4)
which is a reduced-form selection equation that lets the explanatory variables in all time periods
appear in the selection equation at time t. Following Mundlak (1978), we replace xiwith ðxit ; xiÞ at time
t, thereby allowing coefﬁcients to be constant across time and conserving the degrees of freedom.
In the second stage, we estimate the effect of trade adjustment assistance and trade reform on
economic outcomes. To construct a counterfactual for what policies xit a country would have
implemented in the absence of a trade adjustment loan, a policy reaction function is estimated to
relate changes in the policy variables with the deviation of the observed lagged value of each outcome
variable from its desired value:
Dxit ¼ di½ydit  yit1 þ eit ; (5)
where ydit is the desired outcome value of yit, assumed to be invariant across countries and over time for
the study period; di measures adjustment to disequilibrium in the target value; and eit is the
unobservable error term. For a detailed discussion and motivation on this type of policy reaction
function, see Goldstein and Montiel (1986), Khan and Montiel (1989), Faini et al. (1991), and Conway
(1994). Substituting the participation function (4) and policy reaction function (5) into Eq. (1), we
obtain:
Dyit ¼ ðad þ 1Þyit1 þ axit1 þ bsit þ fwit þ ci1 þ ðuit þ aeitÞ; t ¼ 1; . . . ; T (6)
3 The inverse Mill’s ratio, introduced by Heckman (1979), is a monotonically decreasing function (ranging from 0 to inﬁnity)
of the probability that an observation is selected into the sample of non-program or non-participating countries.
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Note that we need to enforce the equality of parameter a across groups, otherwise Eq. (5) will not
adjust for differences in these variables across groups. This approach helps mitigate the simultaneous
presence of sample selectivity (sit) and unobserved heterogeneity (ci1, ci2) that we aim to control for in
our estimation.
4. Estimation results
In Tables 4–6, we present our estimation results for three outcome variables (yit): growth of real
GDP per capita, growth of import demand, and growth of export supply. Following the above empirical
speciﬁcation, the control for unobservable country-speciﬁc effects is accounted for by the inverse
Mills ratio, obtained in the ﬁrst stage from estimating for each time period the Probit of a dummy
variable for trade adjustment loan on lagged real GDP per capita growth, lagged dummy for inﬂation of
40 percent or higher, lagged external debt to GDP ratio, and a lagged natural disaster dummy. The
estimated inverse Mill’s ratios are then entered into the second stage regression, whereby any
statistical insigniﬁcance of the inverse Mill’s ratio indicates that the potential sample selection bias
has been dealt with in the present context.4
Table 4 reports the results when the outcome variable is the growth rate of real GDP per capita. The
variable of interest is the number of years since trade reform started, deﬁning a dummy variable (LIB)
for each period: let t=0 be the year of trade reform identiﬁed earlier, then LIB[0,2]=1 for t to t+2, and 0
otherwise; LIB[3,5]=1 for t+3 to t+5; and 0 otherwise, LIB[6,8]=1 for t+6 to t+8, and 0 otherwise. The
estimated coefﬁcients of trade reform variables indicate the effects of trade reform on economic
growth in the short run (between 0 and 2 years), medium run (between 3 and 5 years), and long run
(between 6 and 8 years), relative to the two year period (t2 to t1) preceding the reform years.
Wacziarg and Welch (2008) use a similar speciﬁcation of dummy variables to account for the effects of
trade reform. Using this type of reform variables mitigates the endogeneity bias that may arise from
the correlation between tariffs and other economic factors, e.g. inﬂation, real output, and
Table 4
Growth of real GDP per capita after trade reform.
Dependent variable: growth rates of
real GDP per capita
Baseline estimation Correction for panel sample selection
Bank assistance No bank assistance
Lagged growth rate of real GDP per capita 0.68
(7.90)***
1.05
(12.38)***
0.98
(18.49)***
0–2 yrs since trade reform 1.10
(1.57)
1.08
(1.33)
1.06
(0.64)
3–5 yrs since trade reform 1.24
(2.01)*
1.91
(2.60)**
1.72
(2.38)**
6–8 yrs since trade reform 0.83
(1.08)
2.40
(2.62)**
0.46
(0.50)
Inﬂation reduction 0.64
(1.25)
1.08
(1.58)
0.76
(0.77)
Dummy variable for presence of
trade adjustment loans
0.50
(0.62)
Inverse Mill’s ratio to control for selection
of trade assistance and unobserved
heterogeneity
0.36
(0.86)
0.96
(1.90)*
Observations 450 350 100
Adjusted R-squared 0.34 0.53 0.48
Test for homoscedasticity (p-value) 0.11 0.09 0.06
Test for normality of residuals (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Standard errors are in parentheses, with *** (**, *) denoting 1 (5, 10) signiﬁcant level.
4 Note that the panel data spans periods of ten years for all countries, but these are different 10 years for different countries.
An alternative speciﬁcation may try to control for common trends in the growth of global trade as an explanatory variable in the
estimates, also accounting for the pattern of trade growth for the non-reforming developing countries. In addition, it may also
be useful to estimate the model using the trade intensity ratio as the dependent variable.
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Table 5
Growth of imports after trade reform.
Dependent variable: growth rates of imports Baseline estimation Correction for panel sample selection
Bank assistance No bank assistance
Lagged growth rate of imports 0.95
(20.71)***
1.00
(15.39)***
1.15
(22.16)***
0–2 yrs since trade reform 9.45
(2.79)***
8.26
(1.90)*
11.43
(2.94)**
3–5 yrs since trade reform 14.85
(2.79)***
14.37
(2.25)**
10.77
(1.15)
6–8 yrs since trade reform 22.37
(2.79)***
23.93
(2.54)**
8.56
(0.66)
REER changes 0.40
(4.44)***
0.31
(2.79)***
0.53
(3.64)***
Lagged capita GDP growth rates 1.05
(5.37)***
1.19
(4.20)***
1.32
(2.69)**
Time trend 2.54
(2.68)**
2.92
(2.68)**
0.12
(0.08)
Dummy variable for presence of trade
adjustment loans
2.18
(1.32)
Inverse Mill’s ratio to control for selection
of trade assistance and unobserved heterogeneity
0.17
(0.11)
0.33
(0.10)
Observations 450 350 100
Adjusted R-squared 0.51 0.52 0.60
Test for homoscedasticity (p-value) 0.02 0.00 0.78
Test for normality of residuals (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Standard errors are in parentheses, with *** (**, *) denoting 1 (5, 10) signiﬁcant level.
Table 6
Growth of exports after trade reform.
Dependent variable: changes in growth
rates of exports
Baseline estimation Correction for panel sample selection
Bank assistance No bank assistance
Lagged growth rate of exports 0.83
(13.79)***
0.96
(19.41)***
1.05
(7.37)***
3–5 yrs since trade reform 1.71
(1.24)
2.59
(1.70)*
0.38
(0.15)
6–8 yrs since trade reform 1.34
(1.01)
2.59
(1.97)*
0.55
(0.22)
REER changes 0.13
(2.04)**
0.16
(1.59)
0.08
(1.86)
Lagged REER changes 0.08
(1.40)
0.12
(1.90)*
0.15
(1.20)
Infrastructure 1.70
(0.70)
4.17
(3.82)***
11.16
(0.15)
Dummy variable for presence of trade
adjustment loans
0.23
(0.17)
Inverse Mill’s ratio to control for selection
of trade assistance and unobserved heterogeneity
1.70
(1.46)
0.30
(0.29)
Observations 346 270 76
Adjusted R-squared 0.44 0.48 0.50
Test for homoscedasticity (p-value) 0.72 0.65 0.29
Test for normality of residuals (p-value) 0.00 0.01 0.01
Standard errors are in parentheses, with *** (**, *) denoting 1 (5, 10) signiﬁcant level.
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unemployment, or changes in the composition of imports. In addition, this speciﬁcation also reduces
the missing observation problem prevalent in the case of using tariff measures.
Note that we use annual data in the estimation to study the aid for trade episode of interest when
trade adjustment lending by the World Bank was quite active. While a ﬁve or ten year average is
typically employed in some studies to account for any business cycle effect in the data, it is not clear to
us what would be a country-speciﬁc start and end year if we want to purge out the business cycles
effectively, short of information similar to the NBER business cycles. Collapsing the annual
information into an arbitrary period average also poses some challenge to us as it is the annual
variation in economic performance that we wish to track after each country’s trade reform. By using
annual data, we are able to look at the short and medium run effect of the trade adjustment loans more
effectively compared to other conﬁgurations.
For comparison, the left most column of Table 4 ﬁrst presents the results when the sample selection
bias is not dealt with; in this simple speciﬁcation, trade reform has a positive impact on per capita GDP
growth in the medium and long run, but this positive effect is quite small and statistically insigniﬁcant
for the recipient group. The next two columns report a pooled OLS estimation that controls for
unobserved country-speciﬁc factors and a sample selection bias due to Eq. (6). The differences in the
coefﬁcient estimates between the recipient and non-recipient groups suggest that the effects of trade
reforms are dependent of the provision of trade adjustment loans. Thus, unlike in column one, the
estimation results in columns two and three have the advantage of allowing for a full set of
interactions between trade adjustment assistance and trade reforms, among other explanatory
variables.
Based on our preferred speciﬁcation, the overall explanatory power of the estimation is reasonably
good with the adjusted R2 of 0.48–0.53. Note that the positive effect of trade reform on per capita GDP
growth in the short run is statistically indistinguishable from zero; this absence of short-term gains in
aggregate output may be driven by other concurrent stabilization programs in the country. It is also
possible that a large-scale macroeconomic adjustment and stabilization could initially be associated
with a contraction in output in the short run. Nevertheless, our results suggest that trade adjustment
loans increased GDP growth for the recipient group by about 2 percent in the medium term after trade
reform; this is 0.2 percent above the non-recipient group. In the long term, trade adjustment lending
increased growth by 2.4%, whereas the non-recipient group did not register any long-run effects after
trade reform. To compare our results with the literature, Wacziarg and Welch (2008) ﬁnd that the
effects of trade reforms on per capita GDP in the short, medium and long run are – 0.5–0.5 percent,
0.8–2.0 percent, and 1.0–1.5 percent, respectively, which is generally lower than the estimates in our
preferred speciﬁcation.
Next in line are the estimation results with import growth as a dependent variable, reported in
Table 5. Compared to the pre-reform period, the short-run positive effect of trade reform on the
growth of import demand is 8 percent for the recipient group and 11 percent for the non-recipient
group. The ﬁndings are consistent with Santos-Paulino and Thirlwall (2004), who found that import
growth increased by about 6 percent following trade reform. Appreciation of the real effective
exchange rate and lagged GDP growth had the expected positive effects on the growth of imports. The
real exchange rates appeared to be an important determinant of import demand, with stronger effects
on import demand growth for the non-recipient group in the short run. For the recipient group, import
growth increased signiﬁcantly in all periods after trade reform, while for the non-recipient group
import growth did not register any statistically signiﬁcant increase in the medium and long term. By
including an exogenous time trend, we hope to assess whether import growth follows any particular
pattern after trade reform, and ﬁnd that there is some trending toward lower import growth for the
recipient group. Compared to the non-recipient group, the presence of trade adjustment loans
increased import growth by an additional 6 percent in the medium term and 10 percent in the long
term.
In Table 6, we report the results for export growth. As expected, coefﬁcient estimates on the real
effective exchange rates are negative for both recipient and non-recipient groups. The regression
for the recipient group shows that trade reforms have a positive and statistically signiﬁcant impact
on export growth, whereas the impact of trade reform on the export growth rate is statistically
indistinguishable from zero for the non-recipient group. Nonetheless, the effects of trade reform
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on export supply response are modest on average. The presence of trade adjustment loans is
associated with a 2.5 percent higher growth of exports during the three to eight years after trade
reform. One interpretation of this low export supply response may be due to greater regulatory
barriers and infrastructure constraints that hinder the export supply response existing prior to
trade reforms in the recipient group. To control for this possibility, a measure of the level of
infrastructure is included in the regression, where it is measured as the length (in kilometers) of
the total road and railroad network per square kilometer of land area. We ﬁnd that the coefﬁcient
estimate on the infrastructure variable is positive and statistically signiﬁcant for the recipient
group, but not for the non-recipient countries. The fact that the infrastructure is especially
important to the recipient group in our analysis may also justify the provision of trade adjustment
lending in the ﬁrst place.5
5. Conclusions
This paper applies a panel regression to examine the effect of trade adjustment assistance on the
economic outcome after trade reform. Our study focuses on trade adjustment lending extended by
the World Bank to countries that underwent major trade reforms during the period from 1987 to
2004. We take into account a potential sample selection bias that may arise in the presence of trade
adjustment loans as well as the endogeneity problem in a cross-country time-series panel that may
be driven by unobservable country-speciﬁc effects. The empirical results suggest that for the capita
GDP growth, trade adjustment loans yielded signiﬁcant and beneﬁcial impacts on the recipient
countries, with additional gains emerging between three to eight years after trade reform. For both
recipient and non-recipient countries, trade reforms increased import growth, with subsequent
gains that sustained over a longer period for the recipient group. The favorable impact of trade
reforms and trade adjustment loans on export growth were rather modest relative to the impact on
GDP growth and import growth.
Our ﬁndings also point to the importance of the selection bias and endogeneity in the panel data
when trade adjustment assistance is studied: for instance, a simple linear regression underestimated
the impact of trade reform on per capita GDP growth by about 2.5 percent in the long run. We also
note that a small export supply response found in the recipient group may imply that, despite the
overall gain in economic growth due to trade reform, the level of a country’s infrastructure remains
crucial to the success of trade adjustment assistance and policy intervention. The fact that
infrastructure is especially important to the recipient group in our analysis may also justify the
provision of trade adjustment lending in the ﬁrst place. Obviously, the historical account presented in
this study is open to many other interpretations. An important consideration, though difﬁcult to
account for empirically, is the credibility of trade reform itself (Rodrik, 2007). Further useful research
in this area should also address a greater delineation of trade reform and aid for trade, incorporate
political and institutional factors, as well as provide additional case studies that examine more
deeply country-speciﬁc policy measures, both tariff and non-tariff barriers, on external trade of the
developing countries.6
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Appendix A. Data sources
Acronyms
WDI World Development Report
IMF Statistical annexes of IMF country reports (various years)
WB World Bank country economists
GDF Global Development Finance
Target variables
(GDPKG) Growth of per capita real GDP
Source WDI series NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD
Description GDP per capita, PPP (constant 1995 international $)
(IMG) Growth of imports to GDP
Source WDI series NE.IMP.GNFS.KD
Description Imports of goods and services (constant 1995 US$) series were used to construct IMG by subtracting from
their growth rates the growth rates of per capita real GDP plus the growth rate of total population
(EXG) Growth of exports to GDP
Source WDI series NE.EXP.GNFS.KD
Description Exports of goods and services (constant 1995 US$) series were used to construct EXG by subtracting from their
growth rates the growth rates of per capita real GDP plus the growth rate of total population
Policy and exogenous variables
(INF) Inﬂation
(INFCX) Inﬂation reduction dummy
Source WDI series FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG, IMF, and WB
Description Inﬂation, consumer prices (annual %) were used to construct INFCX, which takes a value of unity if INF has
been reduced by more than 20% in absolute terms in the past two year, and take a value of zero otherwise
(TOT) Terms of trade
(CTOT) Terms of trade changes
Source WDI series NE.TRM.TRAD.XU, IMF, and WB
Description Terms of trade (goods and services, 1995=100) were re-based so that at two years before trade reform
TOT=100. CTOT is the absolute change of TOT
(DISAST) Natural disaster
Source USAID Emergencies database
Description A dummy variable takes on a value of unity if in that particular year there was a natural disaster that incurred
ﬁnancial costs of more than 0.5% of GDP, or affected more than 5% of the population
(REER) Real exchange rates
(CREER) Real exchange rates changes
Source WDI series PX.REX.REER, IMF, and WB
Description Real effective exchange rate indices (1995=100) were re-based so that at two years before trade reform
REER=100. CREER is the absolute change of REER
(CEX) Commodity-exporter dummy
Source WDI series TX.VAL.MANF.ZS.UN
Description Constructed from manufactures exports (% of merchandize exports), CEX takes on a value of unity if
manufactures exports is less than 50% of merchandize exports, and a value of zero otherwise
(LZK3R) Infrastructure
Source Caldero´n and Serve´n (2004) series lzk3r
Description Length of the total road and railroad network - In km. per sq. km. of land area (in logs), compiled from the
International Road Federation and the World Bank
Economic indicators
(FBAL) Fiscal balance/GDP
Source WDI series GB.BAL.OVRL.GD.ZS, IMF, and WB
Description Overall budget balance, including grants (% of GDP)
(TXRV) Tax revenue/GDP
Source WDI series GB.TAX.TOTL.GD.ZS, IMF, and WB
Description Tax revenue (% of GDP)
(INVG) Growth of investment/GDP
Source WDI series NE.GDI.FTOT.ZS
Description Gross ﬁxed capital formation (% of GDP) was used to construct INVG
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Appendix A (Continued )
(OPEN) Trade/GDP
Source WDI series NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS
Description Measure of openness, calculated as the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a
percentage of gross domestic product
(CABL) Current accounts balance/GDP
Source WDI series BN.CAB.XOKA.GD.ZS
Description The sum of net exports of goods, services, net income, and net current transfers as a percentage of GDP
(DEBT) Total external debt/GNI
Source WDI series DT.DOD.DECT.GN.ZS, IMF, and WB
Description Total external debt to gross national income
(FXRS) Reserves in months of imports
Source GDF series FI.RES.TOTL.MO
Description Net international reserves in months of imports
(DEMOC) Institutionalized democracy
Source Polity IV Project (Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2002) http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/
inscr/polity/
Description (numeric) Range=0–10 (0=low; 10=high) Democracy Score: general openness of political institutions
(REG2004) Index of regulations
Source The World Bank–Doing Business in 2004, http://rru.worldbank.org/DoingBusiness/
Description Following Bolaky and Freund (2004), the 2004 index of regulations is an average of the index of labor
regulations and the index of entry regulations. The ﬁnal values of the regulation index ranging from 3.74 to
4.08 for all 144 countries in the database, and from 3.81 to 4.08 for 42 countries of our 45 countries sample
available from the database
(RULE2002) Rule of law
Source Kaufmann et al. (2004), http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters3.html
Description The rule of law index represents ‘‘the extent to which agents have conﬁdence in and abide by the rules of
society. These include perceptions of the incidence of both violent and non-violent crime, the effectiveness
and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts.’’ (Kaufmann et al., 2004, page 4)
Appendix B. Classiﬁcation of trade reforms
Region Income level Population level Trade adjustment
loans
Pace of trade reform
AFRICA Cameroon LOW Cameroon SMALL Cameroon NO Brazil GRADUAL Brazil
Central
AFR Rep.
Central
AFR Rep.
Central
AFR Rep.
Central
AFR Rep.
China
Cote d‘Ivoire Cote d‘Ivoire Chile China Costa Rica
Ghana Ghana Costa Rica Ecuador Cote d‘Ivoire
Kenya India Cote d‘Ivoire Korea,
Rep. of
Dominican
Rep.
Lesotho Kenya Dominican
Rep.
Lesotho India
Madagascar Lesotho Ecuador Paraguay Indonesia
Malawi Madagascar Ghana South Africa Jamaica
Mali Malawi Honduras Trinidad
&Tobago
Jordan
Mauritius Mali Jamaica Venezuela Kenya
Niger Nepal Jordan YES Argentina Madagascar
Nigeria Niger Lesotho Cameroon Malawi
Senegal Nigeria Madagascar Chile Mauritius
South Africa Pakistan Malawi Colombia Morocco
Tanzania Senegal Mali Costa Rica Nepal
Zambia Tanzania Mauritius Cote d‘Ivoire Niger
Zimbabwe Vietnam Nepal Dominican
Rep.
Nigeria
EAP China Zambia Niger Ghana Panama
Indonesia Zimbabwe Panama Honduras Paraguay
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